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Introduction 
Saudi Arabia’s position on the Iraq crisis, and on the various proposals in the American debate 
about what to do in Iraq, is driven primarily by regional balance of power concerns. The primary 
Saudi fear, in official circles, is that Iran will use its position of influence in Iraq to consolidate a 
position of regional dominance in the wake of an American withdrawal. Riyadh therefore has 
urged the United States not to leave Iraq in its current situation, expressing public (if not 
particularly enthusiastic) support for the Bush Administration’s “surge” option.[1] While Saudi 
regional policy can best be apprehended through the lens of classic balance of power politics, 
Sunni-Shi’i sectarian tensions overlay that policy and, perhaps more importantly, are the lens 
through which much of the Saudi public sees the regional situation.  
The Saudi government has not discouraged that view, in an effort to mobilize public support 
behind its policy of balancing Iranian power. However, this appeal to sectarian loyalties—whether 
actively encouraged by the government behind the scenes or simply tolerated—contains its own 
dangers for the Saudi government, both in terms of its own domestic politics of dealing with the 
Shi’i minority in Saudi Arabia and in terms of its policy toward Iran. While hoping to blunt Iranian 
influence, not only in Iraq but throughout the region, Riyadh wants to avoid a direct confrontation 
with Teheran and remains open to cooperation with the Iranians. To the extent that political 
tensions in the region become increasingly and rigidly sectarian, the Saudi government loses the 
flexibility necessary to both block and engage Teheran simultaneously—that is to say, to play the 
classic balance of power game. 
Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi Crisis 
Saudi Arabia was hardly keen on the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, though it cooperated in a 
low-key way with Washington to facilitate military operations. Since that time, as Saudi policy 
makers have expressed their growing dismay at the course of events in Iraq, Riyadh has taken a 
surprisingly passive stance toward events there. That passivity can be attributed to a number of 
factors, but the most important is the Saudi desire to avoid any complications in its relations with 
the United States. As long as the United States is occupying Iraq, any Saudi effort to chart an 
active, independent course toward the country would run the risk of American displeasure. Most 
directly, any Saudi effort to establish direct patron-client relations with Arab Sunni groups or 
factions in Iraq might place them in the very uncomfortable position to supporting people who are 
killing Americans.[2] Thus, while Riyadh has undoubtedly maintained lines of communication with 
all sorts of Iraqi parties and personalities—Arab and Kurd, Sunni and Shi’i, tribal and urban—it 
has not (at least from publicly available evidence) nurtured the kind of relations that Iran has with 
a number of the Iraqi groups. This is unusual for Saudi Arabia. In other inter-Arab conflicts and 
civil wars, most notably in Yemen and Lebanon, the Saudis have developed close ties with 
various parties, mainly through the provision of financial aid and diplomatic support but 
sometimes with direct military aid as well, to affect the course of the conflicts and advance Saudi 
interests. 
Riyadh’s passivity can be sustained as long as the United States is preventing what for the 
Saudis would be the worst case scenarios in Iraq: the consolidation of Iranian influence there 
and/or the effective break-up of the country in a bloody civil war. However, as calls grew in the 
United States for an end to the American military role in Iraq, gaining momentum after the 
Democratic victory in the 2006 Congressional elections, the Saudis were faced with the prospect 
that the United States would no longer be the bulwark against an Iranian-dominated Iraq. They 
feared that The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach might be the 
vehicle through which suggestions for withdrawal would become American policy. They further 
feared that an American decision to withdraw would lead to a new American diplomatic initiative 
toward Iran, acknowledging Iranian primacy in Iraq in exchange for an orderly withdrawal.[3] 
These fears coincided with the on-going Lebanese crisis, which began with the Israeli-Hizballah 
conflict of the summer of 2006 and has continued in the stand-off between Hizballah and its allies 
and the March 14 coalition, which forms the Lebanese government. Saudi Arabia saw events in 
Lebanon, with Iran’s strong support for Hizballah, as further evidence, coming on top of the 
Iranian commitment to continue its nuclear program and Iran’s support for Hamas in the intra-
Palestinian power struggle, that Teheran was seeking a dominant role in the region. 
Thus, in recent months Saudi officials, most prominently the outgoing Saudi ambassador in 
Washington, Prince Turki Al Faysal, very publicly urged the United States not to withdraw 
precipitously from Iraq.[4] Saudi officials and those close to them raised the prospect of direct and 
indirect Saudi intervention in Iraq if the United States were to leave and warned the United States 
against a policy of engaging Iran.[5] The threat of direct Saudi military intervention is most 
probably a bluff. The Saudi military is hardly capable of effective action in Iraq. The threats of a 
more active role supporting Sunni groups are much more credible. Riyad’s reception in October 
2006 of Harith al-Dhari, the leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni Iraqi clerical 
group with purported ties to the Sunni insurgency, is an indication of its options in that regard.[6] 
The Saudi government breathed a sigh of relief as it became clear that the Bush Administration 
was not going to withdraw from Iraq. While Riyadh does not have any particular confidence that 
the United States can achieve its goal of a stable Iraq not under Iranian influence, at least the 
continued presence of American forces in the country kicks the prospect of the Saudi worst case 
scenarios down the road for the time being. 
Saudi Regional Policy and Saudi Public Opinion 
The Saudi government is viewing the Iraq crisis through the lens of regional balance of power 
considerations, looking to check Iranian power. However, Saudi public opinion (among Saudi 
Sunnis, the vast majority of the population) views the Iraq crisis through two interrelated lenses: 1) 
as an American occupation of an Arab land and (for many if not most Saudis) the legitimate 
armed resistance to that occupation; and 2) as a sectarian conflict between overweening Iraqi 
Shi’a and endangered Iraqi Sunni Arabs. 
Since the beginning of the American occupation, Saudis have gone to Iraq to fight with the Sunni 
insurgency against the United States. Their numbers are a matter of some controversy. Many 
Iraqi Shi’a see “Wahhabis” as the core of the insurgency against them. They have good historical 
and ideological grounds on which to suspect that the official Saudi interpretation of Islam 
encourages strong anti-Shi’a sentiments. American military officials contend that non-Iraqis make 
up only a small part of the Sunni insurgent forces, though the foreigners are probably 
overrepresented in the spectacular suicide attacks which spread terror among Iraqi civilians. 
Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid concluded in September 2005 that, based on information 
provided to them from Saudi and American security sources, Saudis made up only about 12 
percent of the foreign fighters in Iraq, which were themselves only about 10 percent of the Sunni 
Arab insurgents.[7] It is regularly asserted that private Saudi financial support helps to sustain the 
Sunni insurgency.[8] While hard evidence of such support is difficult to come by, it seems very 
likely that some Saudis are sending money to Iraqi Sunni insurgents.[9] It has been reported that 
Saudi volunteers are particularly welcome among the insurgents, because they tend to come with 
cash. 
There is no evidence that the Saudi government has encouraged this support by individual 
Saudis, jihadis and financiers, for the Sunni insurgency. Riyadh is building an elaborate security 
fence along its border with Iraq, equally to keep Saudis from going to Iraq as to keep Iraqis from 
coming into Saudi Arabia.[10] Leading clerics from the Saudi religious establishment have 
counseled young Saudis not to join what many Saudis see as the legitimate jihad against the 
American occupation, even while Saudi salafi activists have occasionally encouraged just such 
volunteers.[11] Saudi officials will admit privately that there is nothing they can do to stop Saudis 
from flying to Damascus and entering Iraq from Syrian territory to join the fighting. 
As fighting in Iraq shifted in 2006 to more direct inter-sectarian conflict between Arab Sunnis and 
Arab Shi’a, elements of Saudi public opinion began to emphasize the threat to fellow Sunnis in 
Iraq from the now-dominant Shi’a majority.[12] On December 7, 2006 38 Saudi religious scholars, 
most affiliated with the Islamic universities in the country, posted an on-line call for the Sunni 
world to rally to the support of the embattled Sunni minority in Iraq. Their declaration contended 
that the United States (the “crusaders,” in an echo of bin Laden’s rhetoric) and the Iranians 
(referred to as the “Safavis,” the Iranian dynasty which converted the country to Shi’ism in the 
16th and 17th centuries) had conspired together to destroy Iraq and contain Sunni influence 
throughout the region. The declaration refers repeatedly to Shi’a as “al-rafida,” a defamatory label 
identifying them as “rejecters” of the true Islam.[13] Some well-known Saudi salafi activists further 
stirred the pot by issuing fatwas openly condemning the Shi’a as non-Muslims.[14] While this kind 
of clerical opinion is not new in the Wahhabi tradition, the timing of these fatwas pushed the 
sectarian issue to the forefront at a time of heightened regional tensions. The circumstances 
surrounding the execution of Saddam Hussein in late December 2006 exacerbated the sectarian 
issue for many Saudis who are not normally sympathetic with either the more extreme elements 
of the country’s religious establishment or with the former Ba’athist regime in Baghdad.[15] 
There is no question now that sectarian identity, never far below the surface in the Middle East, 
has risen to new prominence in the way the region’s publics are interpreting not only the Iraq 
crisis, but also the Lebanese crisis and the effort by the United States to form a bloc of Arab 
Sunni states aimed at isolating Iran. How long this sectarian salience will last, in Saudi Arabia and 
in the region in general, is difficult to judge. To the extent that the Lebanese crisis continues, 
Sunni-Shi’a tensions will be exacerbated. However, if Lebanon cools down, a major driver of 
sectarian tensions will be removed. Iraq will continue for some time to provide fodder for those 
seeking to exploit sectarian differences. Even now, however, there are efforts by leading Islamist 
figures like the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, to 
cool the sectarian passions stirred up by some Sunni activists.[16] 
Saudi Regional Policy: Anti-Iranian or Anti-Shi’a? And to What Extent? 
I argued above that the Saudi government views Iran’s efforts to spread its influence in the Arab 
world—in Iraq, Lebanon, among Palestinians and in Arab public opinion generally—through the 
lens of balance of power politics, not sectarian identities. I come to that conclusion based on two 
major factors. First, the Saudi government itself has not played the sectarian card in the recent 
crises. On the contrary, Saudi writers who normally reflect elite opinion in the kingdom have gone 
out of their way to emphasize that it is Iranian power, not “Shi’a power,” that is of concern.[17] 
The Saudis sponsored a meeting in Mecca in October 2006 in which Sunni and Shi’a clerics from 
Iraq issued a statement condemning sectarian violence, the shedding of the blood of fellow 
Muslims, attacks on religious sites and forcing people to leave their homes.[18] King Abdallah 
himself recently told an interviewer that he thought Sunni-Shi’a tensions were “a matter of 
concern, not a matter of danger,” and that if handled correctly those tensions would not become 
dangerous. When asked in the same interview about allegations of Shi’a efforts to convert Sunnis 
in Arab countries, the King said that such efforts would fail, but quickly changed the subject to the 
support the kingdom gives to conferences aimed at bridging Sunni-Shi’a differences.[19] 
Second, the Saudi government has been on a minor, but in the Saudi context significant, charm 
offensive toward its own Shi’a minority for a number of years. The Saudi Shi’a leader Hassan al-
Safar was very publicly invited to participate in the King’s “National Dialogue” initiative which 
began in 2003, and was photographed with Abdallah at the first meeting of the Dialogue. 
Municipal council elections in 2005 allowed Saudi Shi’a to elect representatives for the first time 
in decades to help manage their cities (though the elected members comprise only half of the 
members of these councils, and the councils themselves do not have much power). Perhaps 
most importantly from a symbolic standpoint, Saudi Shi’a for the past three years have been able 
to commemorate the Shi’a feast of Ashura publicly. Such public commemorations had been 
banned for decades, and are particularly offensive to hard-line salafis from the Wahhabi 
tradition.[20] While Saudi Shi’a certainly feel the effects of rising sectarian tensions, I did not hear 
in my conversations with a number of Shi’a leaders during a visit to the Shi’a city of Qatif in early 
January 2007 that they felt that the Saudi government was reversing its tentative policies of 
outreach to their community. If Riyadh were viewing the rise of Iranian regional power primarily 
through a sectarian lens, the first place that it would react would be against its own Shi’a 
population, as it has done in the past. 
That being said, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni Arab states worried about 
Iranian power are willing to play to the baser instincts of their own constituencies in allowing anti-
Shia rhetoric to develop. The Saudi government could have cracked down on the salafi activists 
who raised the sectarian issue, but did not, at least in any public way, as of yet. From our own 
experience in the United States, we know that mobilizing public support for a foreign policy based 
on cold, realist, balance of power considerations is a tough sell. It would be an even harder sell 
for these Arab leaders, whose populations basically like the idea of Iran developing a nuclear 
program and cheered Hizballah in its confrontation with Israel this past summer. The Sunni Arab 
leaders cannot sell the policy on the basis of balancing Iran, so they sell it (or allow it to be sold) 
on a sectarian basis. The danger in this kind of cynical manipulation is that sectarian tensions 
might escape the control of these governments. In the Saudi case, the escalation of sectarian 
tensions could both complicate, if not reverse, King Abdallah’s efforts to reach out to the Saudi 
Shi’a minority and make it more difficult for Riyadh to pursue a nuanced policy toward Iran and 
the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. Playing with the sectarian issue is playing with fire. The 
Saudi government clearly believes that it can keep the fire under control. Whether it can remains 
to be seen. 
Saudi Arabia seeks to balance, if not roll back, Iranian power—in Lebanon, among Palestinians 
and in Iraq. However, Riyadh is pursuing its balance of power strategy in a nuanced rather than 
overtly confrontational way. King Abdallah publicly received Iranian National Security Advisor 
Larijani in Riyadh, and dispatched his diplomatic trouble-shooter, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, 
former Saudi Ambassador to Washington, to Teheran in late January for consultations on the 
Lebanon issue. The King emphasized in the interview cited above that he advised Larijani that 
Iran should be careful to observe limits in its dealings with outside powers, but at the same time 
assured the Iranians that Saudi Arabia had not joined a bloc against them nor would Saudi Arabia 
support any efforts to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[21] The Saudi-owned Arab press has 
highlighted the beneficial effects of the Saudi-Iranian dialogue on de-escalating the Lebanese 
crisis.[22] Whether these contacts can actually avert a renewal of violence in Lebanon remains to 
be seen, but it is interesting that the Saudis are portraying them this way. 
American Regional Strategy, Saudi Arabia and the Sectarian Temptation 
The Bush Administration is seeking to build an ad-hoc coalition of regional states to blunt growing 
Iranian influence in the Middle East. That coalition includes Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf states, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon’s embattled government and, on the sidelines, Israel. Saudi Arabia has 
indicated its willingness to play a role in this effort. If the various visits of Prince Bandar to 
Washington over the past months are any indication, it is possible that Riyadh might even have 
had a role in the construction of this coalition.[23] But Washington should not assume that Riyadh 
is on board for a policy of direct confrontation with Teheran. The Saudis know that they will be 
among the first targets for Iranian retaliation if the United States strikes Iran militarily. They lived 
through a period of intense hostility with Iran during the 1980’s, as Ayatallah Khomeini sought to 
export the Iranian revolution and Riyadh backed Iraq in its war against Iran. They are not anxious 
to repeat that experience. The Saudis prefer a policy of working to roll back Iranian influence at its 
margins—in Lebanon, Palestine, among Arab public opinion—to a policy of striking directly at the 
Iranian government. They worry about Iranian influence in Iraq, but have few practical 
instruments to counter it there at this time, which is why they are happy that the United States is 
staying in Iraq. 
American policy toward Iran, like that of the Saudis, seems to be driven by regional balance of 
power concerns. If Washington were concerned about “Shi’a power,” as opposed to Iranian 
power, it would not be backing the al-Maliki government in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s list of 
Middle Eastern enemies is ecumenical, including Sunni Hamas and the Ba’athist regime in Syria 
(sociologically Alawi Shi’a but politically secular nationalist), perhaps even Maronite Christian 
Michel Aoun in Lebanon, as well as Iran and Hizballah. However, there is more than a hint of 
sectarianism in the coalition of Sunni Arab governments that the United States is pushing to 
counter Iranian power. Washington must be aware of that. As with Saudi Arabia, playing the 
sectarian card is a double-edged sword for the United States. It might help in the short term to 
mobilize opinion in the Arab world against Teheran’s efforts to extend its influence. However, 
fanning anti-Shi’a sentiment in the Arab world directly supports the world view of extremist Sunni 
salafi jihadists like al-Qaeda.[24] We need to recall that the salafi jihadist movement, of which al-
Qaeda is but one manifestation, emerged in the atmosphere of heightened sectarian tensions of 
the 1980’s, as the new Iranian revolutionary regime and the Saudis contested for leadership of 
the Muslim world and Iran and Iraq fought their long and pointless war. It is certainly not in the 
American interest to do anything to recreate that atmosphere of regional sectarian tensions, 
which would give aid and comfort al-Qaeda and its ilk.  
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